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CRIMINAL LAW-Firearms Possession-New York Statutory
Exception Reducing Possession of a Loaded Firearm From a
Felony to a Misdemeanor When In One's Place of Business Does
Not Apply to an Employee Lacking a Proprietary Interest.
People v. Francis, 45 App. Div. 2d 431, 358 N.Y.S.2d 148 (2d Dep't
1974).
Defendant was arrested while at his place of employment (a
United States Post Office) for the unlawful possession of a weapon.'
In New York illegal possession of a loaded firearm is a felony.2 Upon
conviction3 defendant appealed, claiming that he came within the
exception of section 265.05 of the New York Penal Law, which states
1. People v. Francis, 45 App. Div. 2d 431, 358 N.Y.S.2d 148 (2d Dep't
1974).
2. The New York firearms law, which encompassed all the various
crimes of possession of weapons, was formerly codified as N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 265.05 (McKinney 1967) [hereinafter cited as OLD LAW]. OLD LAW §
265.05(2) provided: "Any person who has in his possession any firearm
which is loaded with ammunition, or who has in his possession any firearm
and, at the same time, has in his possession a quantity of ammunition
which may be used to discharge such firearm is guilty of a class D felony.
Such possession shall not, except as provided in subdivision three of this
section [previous conviction], constitute a felony if such possession takes
place in such person's home or place of business." In 1974 a new firearms
law was enacted. The new firearms law, codified at N.Y. PENAL LAW §§
265.01-.04 (McKinney Supp. 1974) [hereinafter cited as NEW LAW], is the
substantive equivalent of the OLD LAW. See NEW LAW § 265.03, 1974 Prac-
tice Commentary. NEW LAW section 265.02(4), the present counterpart of
OLD LAW section 265.05(2), provides that a person is guilty of criminal
possession of a weapon in the third degree when "[hie possesses any
loaded firearm. Such possession shall not, except as provided in subdivi-
sion one [previous conviction], constitute a violation of this section if such
possession takes place in such person's home or place of business. Criminal
possession of a weapon in the third degree is a class D felony." Therefore,
possession of a firearm in one's home or place of business or possession of
an unloaded firearm is a misdemeanor unless such possessor has a prior
felony conviction, in which case he is guilty of a felony.
3. The defendant was indicted for possession of a weapon as a class D
felony and was allowed to plead guilty to attempted possession of a weapon
as a class E felony. Upon the imposition of sentence defendant appealed
alleging that the trial court erred in accepting his felony plea when he was
guilty of only a misdemeanor. 45 App. Div. 2d at 431, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 150.
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that if a person is found in possession of a loaded firearm in his home
or place of business, he is guilty of only a class A misdemeanor.4 The
appellate division affirmed, refusing to apply the "place of busi-
ness" exception.5
The merits of gun control legislation have received much atten-
tion.' All fifty states plus the District of Columbia have enacted
some form of gun control law,7 attempting to prevent the unlawful
4. OLD LAW § 265.05(3) provided: "Any person who has in his posses-
sion any firearm ... is guilty of a class A misdemeanor ... 
5. 45 App. Div. 2d at 435, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
6. See, e.g., C. BAKAL, THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS (1966); THE NATION,
June 7, 1971, at 706-07; NEW REPUBLIC, May 30, 1970, at 11; U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, Aug. 11, 1969, at 40-41.
7. ALA. CODE tit. 14, §§ 161-86 (1959), as amended, (Supp. 1973);
ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.55.010-.080 (1970), as amended, (Supp. 1973); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-911 to -924 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4501 to
-4525 (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1973); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12000-582
(West 1970), as amended, (West Supp. 1974); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
41-11-1 to -4, 40-11-8 to -11 (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1965); CONN. GEN.
STAT. REV. §§ 53-202 to -206a (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 461-68B
(1953), as amended, (Supp. 1970); id. tit. 24, §§ 901-05 (1953), as amended,
(Supp. 1970); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3201 to -3217 (1967); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 790.01-.26 (1965), as amended, (Supp. 1974); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-2901
to -2909 (1968), as amended, (Supp. 1974); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 134-1 to
-15, -31 to -34, -51 to -52 (Supp. 1973); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-3301 to -3315
(Supp. 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 24-1 to -6 (1970), as amended,
(Supp. 1974); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-4701 to -4759 (Burns 1971); IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 695.1-.29 (1950), as amended, (Supp. 1974); id. § 696.1-.11 (1950),
as amended, (Supp. 1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4201 to -4206 (1974); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 527.010-.060 (Spec. Penal Code Pamphlet 1975); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1751-91 (1965); id. § 40:1801-04 (Supp. 1974); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 391-93 (1965), as amended, (Supp. 1974); id.
tit. 25, §§ 2031, 2041-42 (Supp. 1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 36-36F
(Cum. Supp. 1974); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 140, §§ 121-31H (1972), as
amended, (Supp. 1973); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 28.421-.434 (1967), as
amended, (Supp. 1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.66-.67 (1964), as
amended, (Supp. 1974); id. §§ 624.61, 625.16 (1964); Miss. CODE ANN. §§
97-37-1 to -33 (1972), as amended, (Supp. 1974); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 564.610-
.660 (Vernon 1953), as amended, (Vernon, Cum. Supp. 1975); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 94-3524 to -3530, -3578 to -3579 (1969); NEB. REV. STAT. §§
28-1001 to -1011 (1964); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 202.280-.440 (1973); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § § 159:1-:17 (1964), as amended,. (Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN.
[Vol. III
CASE NOTES
use of these weapons while preserving the privilege to bear arms' for
those who use guns for lawful purposes. These restrictions have been
unsucessfully challenged as violations of both federal9 and state
constitutions.'" Most jurisdictions with gun control statutes do not
§§ 2A:151-1 to -63 (1969), as amended, (Supp. 1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§
40A-7-1 to -8 (1972); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 265.00-.40 (McKinney Supp.
1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-269 to -269.1 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 62-
01-01 to -05-04 (1960), as amended, (Supp. 1973); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 2923.11-.24 (Page, Spec. Supp. 1973), as amended, (Page, Current Serv-
ice mI 1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1273, 1276-82 (1958); id. §§ 1272,
1283-89.16 (Supp. 1974); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 166.180-.645 (1974); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, §§ 6101-41 (1973), as amended, (Supp. 1974); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. §§ 11-47-1 to -56 (1970), as amended, (Supp. 1974); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 16-121 to -149 (1962), as amended, (Supp. 1973); S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. §§ 22-14-1 to -4 (1969); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-4901 to -4919 (1955),
as amended, (Supp. 1974); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 46.01-.08 (1974);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-10-501 to -525 (Supp. 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§§ 4003-15 (1974); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.1-258 to -272 (1960), as amended,
(Cum. Supp. 1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.41.010-.270 (1961), as
amended, (Supp. 1974); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-7-1 to -15 (Supp. 1974);
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 920.20-.24 (1968), as amended, (Supp. 1974); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. §§ 6-237.1 to -246.4 (1959), as amended, (Supp. 1973).
8. As of 1966, fifteen state constitutions contained no specific provision
guaranteeing the right to bear arms. Rohner, The Right to Bear Arms: A
Phenomenon of Constitutional History, 16 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 53, 54
(1966). However, one of those states, Illinois, subsequently amended its
constitution to provide the right, so that the only remaining states are
Arkansas, California, Delaware, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Virginia, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id.; see ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 22.
9. Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535 (1894); United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875) (interpreting the second amendment "right to bear
arms" to be only a limitation on the federal government and not state
governments).
10. Carlton v. State, 63 Fla. 1, 58 So. 486 (1912); Nunn v. State, 1 Ga.
243 (1846); People v. Liss, 406 Ill. 419, 94 N.E.2d 320 (1950); State v.
Angelo, 3 N.J. Misc. 1014, 130 A. 458 (Super. Ct. 1925); People v. Persce,
204 N.Y. 397, 97 N.E. 877 (1912); English v. State, 35 Tex. 473 (1872). But
see Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822) (holding that the
right to bear arms is absolute). For a more detailed discussion of the
constitutional problems of gun control, see AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION,
FIREARMS AND LEGISLATIVE REGULATION (1967); G. NEWTON & F. ZIMRING,
19751
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impose criminal responsibility for the mere possession of a hand-
gun," but limit the place and manner in which guns can be pos-
sessed."2
The New York court, in deciding whether to apply the "place of
business" exception of section 265.05,1 considered the opinions of
other jurisdictions whose statutes contain similar language. In
Texas, "[a] person commits an offense if he intentionally, know-
ingly, or wrecklessly carries on or about his person a handgun
... )NI This restriction does not apply to a person "on his own
premises or premises under his control . ... 'I In Flores v. State, 16
a Texas defendant challenged his felony conviction on the grounds
that he was an employee of the establishment where he was arrested
for possession of a pistol. On appeal, the court held it was reversible
error not to submit the following charge to the jury:
[Wihere a person is employed to work and is working, it is his place of
employment and he has a right under the law to carry a pistol on said
premises. 7
The court interpreted a person's place of employment as "premises
under his control" and within the exception. 8 Thus, the Texas stat-
FIREARMS & VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1970); Bessick, Gun Control
Statutes and Domestic Violence, 19 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 556 (1970); Jacobs,
Firearms Control, 42 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 353 (1968); Levin, The Right to
Bear Arms: The Development of the American Experience, 48 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 148 (1971); Comment, The Impact of State Constitutional Right
to Bear Arms Provisions on State Gun Control Legislation, 38 U. CHI. L.
REV. 185 (1970); Note, Firearms Legislation, 18 VAND. L. REV. 1362 (1965).
11. Although several states require a license or permit to purchase
firearms, New York is the only jurisdiction which requires a license to
possess (keep at home or place of business). C. BAKAL, supra note 6, at 348.
12. Forty-four states prohibit or require a permit to carry concealed
weapons. Id. at 346.
13. See note 2 supra.
14. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.02(a) (1974). The statute further pro-
vides: "An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree if it
occurs on any premises licensed or issued a permit by this state for the sale
or service of alcoholic beverages." Id. § 46.02(c).
15. Id. § 46.03(2).
16. 486 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
17. Id. at 578.
18. The official commentary to TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. section 46.02
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ute neither prevents employees from carrying guns, 9 nor prohibits
a person from carrying a pistol from his home to his place of busi-
ness."° The fact that an employee has no proprietary interest in the
premises where he works does not appear significant; he is still
considered to be within the exception.Coker v. State"' and Miller v. State" interpreted "place of busi-
ness" as used in a Georgia statute 3 prohibiting the carrying of any
pistol or revolver without a license outside the home, automobile,
or place of business.24 In Coker, an overseer of a plantation was
charged with carrying a pistol without a license. The court reversed
his conviction and stated that Coker had a right to carry his pistol
anywhere on the plantation since "'home or place of business'...
[is] broad enough to include any portion of a farm or plantation
where one employs his time and makes his living."2 5 Concerning
defendant's lack of any proprietary interest, the court held that
"[t]he plantation was as much his home and place of business as
if he owned it."26 Any doubts as to the scope of the Coker reasoning
were settled in Miller, where defendant, a farm laborer, was charged
with carrying a weapon without a license from his lodging to his
employer's residence. 7 The court held: "the space between [the
observes that the Texas courts construe the law to permit an employee to
carry a weapon on his employer's premises. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.02,
1974 Practice Commentary (Supp. 1974).
19. Barker v. Satterfield, 111 S.W. 437 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908); Page v.
State, 25 S.W. 774 (Tex. Crim. App. 1894); Poston v. State, 132 Tex. Crim.
317, 104 S.W.2d 516 (1937).
20. Davis v. State, 135 Tex. Crim. 659, 122 S.W.2d 635 (1938). How-
ever, a gun may not be carried habitually between home and business. Id.
at 661, 122 S.W.2d at 636.
21. 12 Ga. App. 425, 76 S.E. 103 (1912).
22. 12 Ga. App. 479, 77 S.E. 653 (1913).
23. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2904 (1968), as amended, (Supp. 1974).
24. Id. § 26-2903 provides: "A person commits a misdemeanor when he
has or carries on or about his person outside of his home, automobile or
place of business any pistol or revolver, whether concealed or not, for which
he has not obtained a license from the ordinary of the county in which he
resides."
25. 12 Ga. App. at 426, 76 S.E. at 104.
26. Id.
27. Even though the employee's lodging and the employer's residence
were on the same plantation, the reasoning would appear to apply even if
1975]
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employer's house] and the house occupied by the accused ... are
included ... within the term 'place of business' . . . ."I'
Both Coker and Miller interpret "place of business" to be the
place where one earns his livelihood,29 defining the term as it is
commonly understood. This interpretation, coupled with no re-
quirement of any proprietary interest,3' gives the "place of business"
exception the maximum scope possible and excepts the person from
criminal responsibility for possession of a pistol without a license.',
The Illinois Criminal Code32 contains a provision similar to that
of Texas and Georgia but prohibits the carrying of a concealed
weapon in any vehicle. 3 In People v. Cosby,34 defendant cab driver
was found guilty of the unlawful use of a weapon when the arresting
police officer, while checking the defendant's driver's license, ob-
served the butt of a gun belonging to defendant protruding from a
coat lying on the cab's front seat. In affirming the conviction, the
court held that "'fixed place of business' means exactly what it
says-a place that is stationary or permanent."3 While the court
did not consider the issue of whether or not an employee in a fixed
place of business may carry a weapon to and from his home to his
place of business, Cosby seems to signal a literal interpretation of
any exceptions in the Illinois statute.
they were not. Cf. Strickland v. State, 137 Ga. 1, 72 S.E. 260 (1911) (stat-
ute must be given a "reasonable construction").
28. 12 Ga. App. at 479, 77 S.E. at 653.
29. Id.; 12 Ga. App. at 426, 76 S.E. at 104.
30. The question that arises from the definition of the term "place of
business" as the place where one earns his livelihood is whether that defini-
tion can be refined to include a proprietary interest in the place where one
earns his livelihood. If it can be so included, the whole class of employees,
regardless of their work, are excluded from the exception.
31. Newman v. Griffin Foundry & Mach. Co., 38 Ga. App. 518, 144
S.E. 386 (1928); Franklin v. State, 12 Ga. App. 483, 77 S.E. 653 (1913).
32. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 24-1(a)(4) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974).
33. "A person commits the offense of unlawful use of weapons when he
knowingly: Carries concealed in any vehicle or concealed on or about his
person except when on his land or in his own abode or fixed place of
business any pistol, revolver or other firearm . . . ." Id.
34. 118 Ill. App. 2d 169, 255 N.E.2d 54 (1969).
35. Id. at 173, 255 N.E.2d at 57.
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In Peoples v. State,3" defendant was arrested for carrying a con-
cealed firearm,37 and claimed that he was within the home or place
of business exception of the statute.38 Defendant, an employee of a
grocery store,39 observed two men stealing property from the store
and obtained the gun from the back of the store. Defendant accosted
the men and delayed them while waiting for the police, who found
him outside the store with a pistol in his clothing.'" Although the
defendant did not have any proprietary interest in the premises, the
owner of the store testified that he had purchased the gun used by
defendant and implied that defendant had the authorization to pro-
tect the premises. Reversing the conviction,4 the court held that
while the purpose of the statute is to promote firearm safety and
prevent the illegal use of firearms,42 this had to be balanced with a
weapon's "'lawful use in defense of life, home and property and for
other lawful purposes . . . .'"I The result seems appropriate but
the reasoning used, i.e., the ability of the owner to impliedly author-
ize his employee to act as a security guard, gives many employees
the right to handle weapons and qualify for the exception.
New Jersey permits an exception to its prohibition on carrying
36. 287 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 1973).
37. The defendant was charged with violating FLA. STAT. ANN. §
790.01(1) (Supp. 1974), which reads in part: "Whoever shall carry a
concealed weapon on or about his person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor
38. Id. § 790.25(3): "[lIt shall be lawful for the following persons to
own, possess, and lawfully use firearms and other weapons, ammunition,
and supplies for lawful purposes. . . . (N) A person possessing arms at his
place of business."
39. Defendant also lived on the premises, behind the building in an old
car. 287 So. 2d at 66.
40. Naturally, the two men escaped. Id. at 65.
41. Id. at 67.
42. Id.
43. Id.; cf. Rinzler v. Carson, 262 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1972). FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 790.25(4) (Supp. 1973) provides: "This act shall be liberally con-
strued to carry out the declaration of policy herein and in favor of the
constitutional right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes. This act
shall be supplemental and additional to existing rights to bear arms now
guaranteed by law and decisions of the courts of Florida, and nothing
herein shall impair or diminish any of such rights."
1975]
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weapons without a permit." Any firearm possessed in the person's
home, place of business, or other property owned by him is ex-
empted. 5 In State v. Valentine,4" the manager of a bar was arrested
for possession of a revolver during the course of his employment.
The court rejected defendant's contention that he was in his place
of business because defendant had no proprietary interest therein. 7
Interpreting the statute, the court found an overriding public policy
in the legislation to "limit the use of guns as much as possible."48
By interpreting the statute to require a proprietary interest to qual-
ify for the place of business exception, the great majority of all
employees are excluded from this exception.49
New York provides no right to possess any firearm without a
permit5 -regardless of where it is possessed. Violation of the statute
is a class D felony5' unless the possession takes place in the defen-
dant's home or place of business;" in the latter situation, the charge
is reduced to a class A misdemeanor. The initial application of this
reduced charge exception was in a trilogy of taxicab cases 3 in which
defendant cabdrivers were arrested in the course of their employ-
ment for carrying a pistol without a permit. In all three cases the
44. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:151-41 (1969) provides in part: "[Any per-
son who carries, holds or possesses in any automobile . . . or other vehicle,
or on or about his clothes or person, or otherwise in his possession, or in
his possession or under his control in any public place or public area...
[a] pistol or revolver without first having obtained a permit to carry the
same . . . is guilty of a high misdemeanor."
45. Id. § 2A:151-42(a).
46. 124 N.J. Super. 425, 307 A.2d 617 (App. Div. 1973).
47. Id. at 427, 307 A.2d at 619.
48. Id.
49. Id. But the court hinted that the lack of proprietary interest would
not be fatal if there was a specific delegation of authority by the owner to
his employee, thereby enabling the employee to act as security man. Cf.
id.; see State v. Bloom, 11 N.J. Misc. 522, 524, 167 A. 221, 222 (Super. Ct.
1933).
50. NEW LAW § 265.01; OLD LAW § 265.05.
51. See note 2 supra.
52. Id.
53. People v. Santiago, 74 Misc. 2d 10, 343 N.Y.S.2d 805 (Sup. Ct.
1971); People v. Santana, 77 Misc. 2d 414, 354 N.Y.S.2d 387 (Crim. Ct.
1974); People v. Anderson, 74 Misc. 2d 415, 344 N.Y.S.2d 15 (Crim. Ct.
1973).
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felony charge was reduced to a misdemeanor because the cab consti-
tuted defendant's place of business and thus qualified for the excep-
tion.54
The legislative history concerning section 265.0511 offers no guid-
ance as to the extent of the "place of business" exception, and such
questions as whether employees are covered, or whether there is a
requirement of a proprietary interest, have been left to the courts.
In People v. Santiago,5" the court, noting the lack of precedent,"7
dismissed the felony indictment since "the letter and spirit"5 of
section 265.05 required that the possession of a pistol in a taxicab
was "a possession in a 'place of business.' "" In People v. Santana,0
defendant cabdriver emerged from his cab to answer the arresting
officer's questions and was found to possess a concealed revolver.
The court reduced the charge to a misdemeanor and stated:
Subdivision 2 of section 265.05 of the Penal Law places in proper perspec-
tive the seriousness of the crime of possession of a weapon in one's home or
place of business. By reducing it from a felony to a misdemeanor, the section
ascribes a quasi-respectable intent to the possessor, suggesting that he keeps
the weapon to protect himself and his property rather than to employ the
same willfully to another's disadvantage.'"
In considering the fact that defendant did not own the cab, it deter-
mined: "it is of no significance if the cab be fleet-owned, privately-
owned, medallion, 'gypsy' or otherwise."6
The first review of section 265.05(2) in the appellate division was
54. People v. Santana, 77 Misc. 2d 414, 416, 354 N.Y.S.2d 387, 389
(Crim. Ct. 1974); People v. Anderson, 74 Misc. 2d 415, 419, 344 N.Y.S.2d
15, 19 (Crim. Ct. 1973).
55. N.Y. LEGIS. Doc. No. 12, 187th Sess. (1964). This provision first
appeared in subdivision 2 of section 1897 of the former Penal Law, on the
recommendation of the New York State Joint Legislative Committee on
Firearms and Ammunition. Law of Apr. 10, 1964, ch. 521, § 1, [1964] N.Y.
Laws 1479 (repealed 1974).
56. 74 Misc. 2d 10, 343 N.Y.S.2d 805 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
57. Id. at 11, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 806.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 77 Misc. 2d 414, 354 N.Y.S.2d 387 (Crim. Ct. 1974).
61. Id. at 415, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 389.
62. Id.
1975]
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People v. Levine.63 Defendant cabdriver, while operating his cab,
became involved in an argument with another motorist and dis-
played his pistol. The other motorist was an off-duty patrolman and
the defendant was arrested and indicted for a felony. 4 The appellate
division affirmed the trial court's felony conviction, though it re-
duced the defendant's sentence to a five year term of probation.
Levine focuses on the conflicting goals inherent in most gun control
legislation: reducing the availability of guns for criminal purposes
while retaining their access for legitimate reasons such as the de-
fense of one's home or place of business. While New York denies
firearms to all its citizens without a permit, it also distinguishes the
situation where it is probable that the individual had possession for
a nonviolent purpose, i.e., in defense of his home or business," by
providing for a reduced charge." The flaw in this consideration is
that in a highly urbanized society there are frequent frayings of
tempers, and, as in Levine, when a firearm is readily available, the
distinction between its use in defense of one's business and in an
agressive and therefore criminal manner, is illusory. It helps the
victim little if the aggressor had an honorable motive to carry the
weapon but used it criminally 7 or whether the aggressor had crimi-
nal intentions from the beginning.
People v. Francis" discusses the rationale for including or exclud-
ing individuals from the section 265.05 exception, and adopts a
narrow interpretation of "place of business." In holding that the
lack of a proprietary interest denies one the mitigating effects of the
exception, the court has determined that an employee has no place
of business within the meaning of the statute." In rejecting the
63. 42 App. Div. 2d 769, 346 N.Y.S.2d 756 (2d Dep't 1973) (mem.).
64. See 45 App. Div. 2d at 433, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 151, citing Levine.
65. NEW LAW § 265.02(4); OLD LAW § 265.05(2).
66. Id.
67. The vast majority of homicides resulting from firearms are commit-
ted in a moment of rage and are not generally the result of a single-minded
intent to kill. STAFF OF THE NAT'L COMM'N ON THE CAUSES & PREVENTION OF
VIOLENCE, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN LIFE 48 (1970). Seventy-four
percent of the victims of homicides in Chicago in 1967 were acquainted
with their assailants. Zimring, Is Gun Control Likely to Reduce Violent
Killings?, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 721, 722 (1968).
68. 45 App. Div. 2d 431, 358 N.Y.S.2d 148 (2d Dep't 1974).
69. Id. at 435, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
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dissent's argument that "the words 'place of business' should be
construed, at the very least, as including any fixed place of employ-
ment" the majority stated:
Such reasoning, pursued to its ultimate conclusion, seemingly would condone
the act of countless numbers of employees of large corporations and govern-
mental agencies in carrying illegal, concealed, operable guns at their places
of employment, subject only to a charge of a misdemeanor rather than a
felony. The foreseeable consequences are foreboding. 0
Francis interpreted the purpose of section 265.05 "to limit the use
of guns, ever mindful of the fact that 'concealed weapons present
an immediate and real danger to the public.' ""'
The ramifications of Francis are substantial. If upheld by the
court of appeals"2 it will signal a fundamental change in the view of
the New York courts from one emphasizing the privilege of the
individual to bear arms to one which penalizes "conduct which
unjustifiably and inexcusably causes or threatens substantial harm
to individual or public interests . . . ."I' It cannot be disputed that
the type of conduct displayed in Levine (the brandishing of a gun)
constituted a threat of substantial harm. Francis is a departure from
the reasoning of most other jurisdictions. It signals a judicial atti-
tude of strict interpretation of the law and gives new meaning to a
statute which, whenever violated, only lightly penalized the viola-
tor.7"
The dissent in Francis claimed that the narrow construction of
the section did not give it "the meaning that could reasonably be
ascribed to it by the average person." 5 When the interpretation of
the Texas and Georgia statutes as including employees within the
70. Id.
71. Id. See also People v. Moore, 32 N.Y.2d 67, 72, 295 N.E.2d 780, 784,
343 N.Y.S.2d 107, 113, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1011 (1973).
72. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5601(a) (McKinney Supp. 1974) allows an appeal
as a matter of right to the New York Court of Appeals by virtue of a dissent
at the Appellate Division level.
73. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05(1) (McKinney 1967).
74. People v. Santiago, 74 Misc. 2d 10, 343 N.Y.S.2d 805 (Sup. Ct.
1971); People v. Santana, 77 Misc. 2d 414, 354 N.Y.S.2d 387 (Crim. Ct.
1974); People v. Anderson, 74 Misc. 2d 415, 344 N.Y.S.2d 15 (Crim. Ct.
1973).
75. 45 App. Div. 2d at 439, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 157 (dissenting opinion).
1975]
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
exception is considered, it appears reasonable that the "common
understanding of men" as to the meaning of "place of business"
could differ. While the Penal Law must give "fair warning of the
nature of the conduct proscribed,"7 the present decision did not
cast an unfair burden on the defendant since his sentence was re-
duced to the time already served."
Thus another effect of Francis is to give notice, if Levine did not,
of the position New York courts will take when faced with an em-
ployee in possession of a weapon without a license in the course of
his employment. It appears unlikely that any employee can sucess-
fully assert that his place of employment is his place of business as
meant by the statute.18
The ultimate goal of all gun control legislation is to reduce the
availability of weapons for criminal purposes. In Francis the court
has manifested a determination to insure that this goal is attained.
However, if the courts are to deny law abiding individuals the abil-
ity to defend themselves with the most lethal means available, it is
essential that criminals also be denied this force.
James S. Normile
76. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05(2) (McKinney 1967).
77. 45 App. Div. 2d at 435, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 153. The court stated that
the "judgment should be modified, as a matter of discretion in the interests
of justice, by reducing the sentence to the time served . . . ." Id. "The
defendant was released on bail March 28, 1973 after serving about five
weeks of his six months sentence." Id. at 439 n.4, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 157 n.4
(dissenting opinion).
78. The majority in Francis seemed to approve of the specific delega-
tion of power in Peoples v. State, 287 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 1973). 45 App. Div.
2d at 434, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 152. See also text accompanying note 43 supra.
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